INTRODUCTION
The tremendous surge in unaccompanied, Central American minors making the perilous journey to the United States has prompted renewed attention to the living conditions fueling the migration. 1 Honduras, for example, has recorded the highest homicide rate in the world, causing many families to live under the constant threat of violence. 2 The fact that so many choose to travel over a thousand miles through hostile conditions to reach a nation that tries to turn them back adequately demonstrates the pressing demand that exists the rule of law in Central America.
In a much better world, of course, these children would not need to migrate to the U.S; they and their families could live in peace and develop their capabilities in their own countries if they chose.
Over the last several years, the Honduran government has been aggressively developing a project that it believes will provide its citizens the ability to do just that. By establishing special autonomous "ciudades modelo" ("model cities"), it seeks to provide Hondurans with alternative jurisdictions in which they can find safety and opportunities. Hondurans would then freely "vote with their feet" for the most effective governments, while the governments, in turn, would compete for Hondurans by ensuring the rule of law without influence from the endemically corrupt, entrenched institutions in the rest of the country. The project, now formally called "Zones for Employment and Economic Development" ("ZEDEs"), received approval from the Honduran Supreme Court earlier this year and is currently undergoing feasibility studies.
The ZEDEs evolved from a concept originally introduced by economist Paul Romer, who proposed an idea he called "charter cities." Charter cities would be the government equivalent 1 See, e.g., Scarlett Aldebot-Green, Argument, America's Young Refugees, FOREIGN POLICY MAGAZINE (July 8, 2014). to a startup business--new autonomous, city-sized territories in which public policy ideas could be tested and, if successful, replicated throughout the countries and regions encompassing them.
Charter cities would have their own governments, laws, and courts and operate with limited interference from the national government or its political processes. Ideally, the cities would help accelerate the development, spread, and implementation of positive policy reforms by demonstrating whether the policies work.
In Romer's charter cities concept, the analysis simultaneously provides insight into the legality the charter cities concept more broadly. If Romer's idea is implemented in other countries with similar constitutional provisions to Honduras, many of the same legal questions will be raised, which makes the ZEDE decision an important test case.
Part I delves into the complex history of the ZEDEs' formation and observes the contrast between the motivations and methods of the Honduran Congress--in effect, the Congress is attempting to spread the rule of law by subverting it. To explain this history, Part I traces the ZEDE's theoretical origin to Paul Romer's vision for experimental reform zones in which the rule of law and good governance could evolve free from corrupting entrenched interests and provide migrants with expanded opportunities. It also describes the lengths to which the Honduran National Party has been willing to go to implement the idea.
Part II explains the structure, powers, and responsibilities of the ZEDE governments and provides a substantive analysis of the ZEDE laws. It examines the laws in light of the arguments that successfully invalidated the previous RED laws and raises several other potential constitutional concerns with the ZEDEs. In concluding that the laws are constitutional, it notes a few easily overlooked aspects to the ZEDEs.
Finally, the paper concludes with suggestions for how the ZEDEs laws could be supplemented to better achieve their goals. It argues that if the Honduran government truly wants to create autonomous enclaves that freely experiment and pilot positive public-policy reforms, it could (1) amend Article 206, which prevents Congress from delegating its powers to other entities, to explicitly exclude the ZEDE authorities; (2) pass an additional law explicitly preventing
Congress from interfering with the ZEDE authorities except in certain matters; and (3) contract with ZEDE investors, or possibly ZEDE authorities, and make the contracts enforceable under CAFTA or bilateral investment treaties through binding arbitration. This conclusion notes, however, that the more autonomous the ZEDEs become, the more necessary it will be to create mechanisms for encouraging transparency and removing ineffective governments and replacing them with better ones. Nevertheless, the idea has been propelled forward in recent years by President Juan Hernandez, albeit with significant changes and under significant protest. Paul Romer is no longer involved, the project appears less transparent and democratic, four Supreme Court Judges have been fired after striking the law down, and the project faces continual opposition from various civil society organizations. The first city will likely be built in the Gulf of Fonseca, with assistance from the South Korean government and the South Korean engineering firm, Posco Plantec.
A. Theoretical Origins of the Concept
Paul Romer is an economist and urban scholar at NYU who became well-known in economics circles in 1990 when he published a paper titled Endogenous Technological Change. 10 While for centuries economists had developed models explaining raw materials, labor, and capital in economic growth, the paper first introduced a model accounting for the additional factor of technological change. Technological change relies on the emergence, dissemination, and implementation of new knowledge about how other production factors should be combined and used.
Over the next several years, Romer began exploring why some types of knowledge spread more easily than others. In particular, he observed that knowledge about how to govern a society effectively tends to spread and be implemented with more difficulty than technical knowledge.
The reason, in his opinion, was that implementing good public policy ideas requires a high level of coordination between people who have entrenched interests in the status quo. Technical ideas, business models, and other private-sector types of knowledge often are not as hindered because competitive markets and low barriers to entry for start-up enterprises force continual change to the status quo, leading to constant improvement of products and services to better meet consumer demand.
Thus, to overcome stagnation in public policy, Romer conceived of a public-sector analogue to start-up businesses--independent "charter cities" that would experiment with reforms and compete with existing governments by finding better ways of promoting the public good. 11 The cities would be built on uninhabited land set aside by one or more countries and would attempt to provide better alternatives for both foreign investors and migrants than the institutions in the surrounding developing nations. Foreign investors would be attracted by rules that make the city a more stable place for investment than politically risky developing nations. Migrants from developing nations would be attracted by rules that make the city a better option for finding employment than either making the perilous journey to wealthier nations (where they often will not find legal status) or staying where they are.
Under Romer's idea, each charter city would establish a charter that would outline the basic privileges of the people who settle there and the responsibilities of the city government.
Voluntary mobility, rather than democratic accountability, would fundamentally safeguard the interests of the settlers. In Romer's original conception, two basic guarantees would have to underlie every charter: (1) The city's rules would only apply to those who choose to live under them, and (2) the rules would apply equally to all residents. The first principle ensures that people would be able to leave at any time they choose, making submission to the city's government entirely voluntary and offering people the freedom to choose a different option the moment the city does not provide a better alternative. The second principle ensures that some residents are not favored more than others.
Crucially, Romer believed that to effectively transmit knowledge about how to govern a society effectively, charter cities should have partner governments and institutions from developed nations that assist with the establishment of effective service delivery and institutions.
According to Romer, this assistance would not even need to greatly affect the partner nations' aid budgets. 12 Most, if not all, of the services could be provided by fee. For example, if Canada were a partner nation, the city could pay the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to provide police training for the city's new law enforcement organs.
The charter cities concept also relies on incentive schemes to motivate the government to effectively promote the public welfare. Under Romer's vision, the city government would own the land the city sits on, following the example of Hong Kong and Singapore. 13 The city would then lease out portions of land to private parties and collect revenue off the leases. The private parties would own the structures built on the land and rent or sell them to others.
City ownership of land would provide a public revenue stream (possibly even avoiding the need for taxes), and also create an incentive for the government to provide effective services. For example, if the city created a well-functioning education system that developed residents' capabilities, the residents would be able to work in higher-skilled occupations and enhance the city's culture. This, in turn, would attract new and diverse employers and raise the value of the land. As the value of the land increases, the city government will be able to collect more revenue from its leases. Well-functioning law enforcement, infrastructure, parks, etc. would all have a similarly positive effect on land value. This incentive system would provide more security for the public good than city officials' sense of public duty or concern for international reputation.
Romer is quick to observe that the charter city idea is not unprecedented. appealed to the Privy Council in the UK. 35 According to Romer, using well-respected external courts would provide an added layer of legitimacy, accountability, and impartiality to the REDs' judicial systems. 36 Still, Romer could not find a developed nation that was willing to become a full partner to help supervise the REDs; something Romer believed was crucial to his charter cities concept 37 but to which the Honduran government did not seem committed. 38 The Honduran government apparently grew impatient and, without Romer's or the rest of the transparency commission's knowledge, President Lobo signed an agreement in September 2012 with MGK, a private development company to build the first three cities. 39 Romer resigned from the commission 40 and speculation rose that the cities would be privately run.
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Shortly afterward, a constitutional challenge against the REDs reached the Honduran Supreme
Court of Justice, alleging that they violated unamendable provisions of the constitution concerning sovereignty, form of government, and national territory. The RED laws were challenged on the basis that they effectively surrendered Honduran territory to foreign entities and therefore violated unamendable provisions of the constitution protecting sovereignty, form of government, and national territory. Under Honduran law, the five-justice Sala de lo On October 2, 2011, the Constitutional Chamber ruled 4-1 in favor of declaring the RED Amendment unconstitutional. 44 On October 18, 2011, the entire court affirmed this decision with a vote of 13-1, thereby invalidating both the RED Amendment and, by extension, the RED Statute. 45 The opposing party's brief challenging the REDs 46 and the opinion of the Public Ministry, 47 which also opposed the REDs, are attached as Appendix C.
Later that year, the Supreme Court again struck down another effort of Honduran President Porfiro Lobo, 48 which prompted Lobo to speak out angrily against the Court. 49 Congress, led by President Lobo's majority National Party, then passed a law removing and replacing four justices, all of whom had voted against the RED Amendment earlier that year. 50 After a fifth replacement the following year, 51 all seats of the Constitutional Chamber are now filled with new congressional appointees. 52 Since the Constitution entitles judges to seven-year terms, the The following day, the government announced the members President Hernández had appointed to the first 21-member "ZEDE Committee for the Implementation of Best Practices", which, will have authority over much of the administration of the first ZEDE, as described in Part II.B. The following briefly summarizes the questions and answers of each of these subsections:
How does the new ZEDE Amendment change the Constitution and what will the administration, powers, and obligations of the model cities be under the ZEDE Statute?
The ZEDE Amendment provides for the creation of the model cities as independent areas for promoting economic development and stipulates that both Congress and a plebiscite of residents must approve their creation. The Amendment also weaves ZEDEs into the framework of subnational governing entities under the Honduran national government and incorporates ZEDE courts within the Honduran judiciary.
Under the ZEDE Statute, each ZEDE administration will consist of a Committee for the Implementation of Best Practices ("Committee"), which will establish general policy guidelines for the ZEDEs; a Technical Secretary, who will have both legislative and executive powers over the ZEDEs; and a common law judiciary that is independent from the rest of the Honduran judiciary. All ZEDE officials are appointed, not popularly elected, and the ZEDE Statute does not contemplate a future transition to popular elections or the creation of a distinct legislative body as the RED Statute envisioned.
Many of the functions, powers, and obligations of the ZEDEs will be the same as the REDs;
though there are a few significant distinctions. Like the REDs, the ZEDEs are empowered to establish independent policies and regulations that promote transparent, competitive, and stable legal and economic environments in which large cities can develop. The ZEDE Statute also explicitly subjects the ZEDEs to the Honduran Constitution, international treaties, and a narrow set of national laws, though, as discussed in Part III, it is probably not effective to prevent
Congress from applying other laws to the ZEDEs.
Unlike the REDs, the ZEDEs can either be limited-purpose jurisdictions--including "international financial centers," "special agricultural zones," or "social mining zones"--or they can be more general "autonomous cities." Also unlike the REDs, the ZEDEs are not empowered to engage in foreign relations or regulate immigration across their borders. The ZEDEs also must allocate 12% of their tax revenue to trusts designated for specific types of development programs instituted at national and sub-national levels. 
Will the ZEDE Amendment and Statute be declared constitutional in

ZEDE Constitutional Amendment
The ZEDE Amendment altered Articles 294, 303, and 329, which relate to, respectively, subnational governments, the judiciary, and economic development. 83 The changes appear designed to address some of the Honduran Supreme Court of Justice's concerns over the RED Amendment relating to form of government and territoriality. They also appear to re-envision the nature of the special zones. Significantly, the Amendment did not stipulate that the zones are necessarily to have an urban character, like the REDs; instead, it explicitly envisions that some will have a population density lower than the average for rural areas. Perhaps to address some of the concerns over the rights of pre-existing residents, the ZEDE Amendment provides these residents with more control over the decision to establish a ZEDE.
Whereas the RED Amendment allowed REDs to be created merely with a 2/3 majority of Congress, 98 the ZEDE Amendment also requires a plebiscite of residents within the proposed Zone, except in areas of population densities lower than the average for rural areas. 99 However, to modify or repeal the ZEDE Statute, the ZEDE only requires a referendum or plebiscite in
ZEDEs having more than 100,000 residents, 100 whereas the RED Amendment required a referendum in all cases.
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Additionally, the amended language of Article 329 recasts the ZEDEs in a more humble light than the RED Amendment, which provided a long a list of functions for the special zones.
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Instead of specifying that they have their own juridical personality, own system of public administration, and own ability to adopt independent legal norms and to sign treaties as the RED 
(a) ZEDE Administration
The ZEDE Statute provides for an administration that is functionally similar to the administration that was intended to be temporary for the REDs. Rather than providing for an eventual transition to democracy, in which legislative and executive functions would be distinct, the ZEDEs are to remain governed by an appointed body of overseers and an appointed individual with both executive and legislative powers. 
(c) Functions and Powers of the ZEDEs
The ZEDE Statute articulates the overall function of the ZEDEs similarly to the RED Statute.
According to the statute, ZEDEs are to establish independent policies and regulations that foster a transparent, competitive, and stable legal and economic environment, which will help Honduras meet its national goals and enter the global market. 132 The statute contemplates that ZEDEs will accomplish this by attracting foreign and domestic investment that will introduce high-value technologies, stimulate economic growth, and create jobs, which, in turn, will reduce social inequalities and provide infrastructure, education, health, and public safety services leading to a "real improvement in the lives of Hondurans."
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To further these aims, the ZEDE Statute confers specific powers on the ZEDEs, many of which were also conferred on REDs. regime, with the ability to impose and collect taxes, use revenue for their own purposes, set a budget, establish rates for services, form contracts, and incur debt without approval from the national government provided that the national government is not responsible for the debt. 134 They may also establish their own educational, health, civil service, and social security systems, and they must guarantee freedom of conscience, religion, and association; provide public space for assembly; 135 and grant labor protection. 136 Regarding property, ZEDEs in urban areas are authorized to recognize private titles to real estate and impose property taxes, 137 though land in low-population-density ZEDEs is to be acquired by the Honduran government, with the ZEDE administering it on the state's behalf and compensating the previous land owners. 138 All ZEDE governments are authorized to lease the land they own 139 and can expropriate public utilities. 140 The only powers conferred on REDs that are noticeably absent from the ZEDE Statute relate to foreign relations and immigration. Unlike the RED statute, the ZEDE statute does not have provisions allowing ZEDE officials to participate in diplomatic negotiations along with the Honduran government, to directly engage in foreign relations themselves, or to apply immigration controls on entry, stay, or exit. 141 Also unlike the RED statute, there are no provisions for dispute resolution for conflicts between ZEDEs and foreign states.
(d) Obligations of the ZEDEs
According to the ZEDE Statute, the laws applicable in ZEDEs are the following in order of authority:
(1) The Honduran Constitution; parties unless the ZEDE law has been repealed for at least ten years.
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The ZEDE statute also directs use of ZEDE revenue in a new but vague way. Each ZEDE must open one or more trusts to hold all of its revenue. 152 The Technical Secretary is then to allocate 12% of all tax revenue to any of five specific trusts, each dedicated to particular purposes.
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The purposes of each of the five trusts are (1) for strengthening the judiciary, which will include staff scholarships, infrastructure, and equipment for universities (presumably legal in nature); (2) for Department-level community projects in accordance with priorities established by the National Congress; (3) for projects promoting development, infrastructure, security, and social character in accordance with priorities established by the ZEDE Technical Secretary; (4) for sharing among all municipalities in the country to promote their municipal projects; (5) for the Honduran Armed Forces to protect national sovereignty. 154 The wording of these provisions is ambiguous; it is unclear whether ZEDEs are to divide up 12% of their income equally across all five trusts, or whether they are to allocate the 12% to as many of the trusts as they choose, as long as they give each trust chosen an equal share. 155 If the latter is true, it is hard to see why a ZEDE would allocate its revenue to any of the trusts besides those that directly benefit the ZEDE, such as (3). Also, the purposes of each trust seem vague and subject to conflicting The ZEDE Statute also contains provisions regarding labor, the environment, and indigenous peoples. Besides their obligation to comply with the International Labor Organization standards and labor treaties signed by Honduras, 157 all employers in the ZEDE must make at least 90% of their workforce Hondurans, who must receive at least 85% of all wages paid by the company, and give preference to Hondurans over equally situated non-Hondurans. 158 Environmental requirements are more vague: ZEDEs "should adopt policies aimed at the protection and preservation of the environment." 159 The ZEDE Statute also requires the ZEDEs to recognize and not violate the property rights that Honduras has granted its indigenous peoples and afrodescendants, such as the Garifuna. 160 It allows ZEDEs to collaborate with these groups for "cooperation and development programs" as long as their culture and customs are accepted and fully respected." The new challenge to the ZEDEs required the Supreme Court to once again decide whether the special zones were constitutional. As a civil law institution, the Court did not need to reconcile its decision on the ZEDEs with its earlier invalidation of the REDs and could therefore freely decide the ZEDE statute anew. Both political and substantive considerations likely motivated the Court to uphold the ZEDEs. However, the Constitution imposes significant limitations on the independence of the ZEDEs, which may ultimately undermine the Hernández administration's long-term ambitions for them unless additional legal protections are introduced.
Given the tenuous state of the rule of law in Honduras, the politics of the justices on the Supreme
Court may have factored as greatly as, or more greatly, than the law in deciding whether the ZEDE Amendment and Statute would be struck down as unconstitutional. On this matter, political considerations appear to weigh heavily in favor of upholding the ZEDE Amendment.
Since the RED Amendment was struck down, President Lobo's National Party of Honduras dramatically changed the composition of the Court. In December 2012, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a law empowering President Lobo to fire allegedly corrupt and violent police officers, reasoning that the firing violated the due process rights of the officers. 162 President Lobo expressed his anger against the court publicly, 163 and his party passed a law removing four Supreme Court justices who were had been opposed to National Party measures and replaced them with four new justices. 164 The constitutionality of the law was challenged, but the Supreme Court has been unable to hear the matter because the Chief Justice, Rivera Avilés, cannot find five justices to appoint to the Constitutional Chamber who are considered impartial on the matter. 165 All four judges installed by the 2012 law were appointed to the Constitutional Chamber. The one remaining justice, Óscar Chinchilla cast the sole vote in favor of the RED Amendment.
Chinchilla stepped down in 2013 to become Public Prosecutor and the National Party-dominated Congress replaced him with Lidia Cardona. 166 Thus, all five of the current justices in the Constitutional Chamber were likely to support National Party measures, such as the ZEDE laws.
Each of these justices are to serve seven-year terms, keeping them in power until 2019-2020. 167 If at least one justice in the Constitutional Chamber were to have held that the ZEDEs are unconstitutional, the matter will go to the full Supreme Court of Justice. Here, the ZEDE laws had a much lower chance of success, given that only four of the original 13 votes against the RED Amendment were replaced. 168 The terms of the remaining justices who voted against the RED Amendment will expire in 2016, when they will be replaced by new congressional appointees.
Thus, when the current challenge to the ZEDE laws reached the Supreme Court, it already had a strong chance of finding unanimous approval in the Constitutional Chamber purely for political reasons. Indeed the Constitutionals Chamber unanimously upheld the statute and the matter was never ruled on by the rest of the Supreme Court.
Substantive Considerations to the Constitutionality of the ZEDE Amendment and Statute
While political factors likely played heavily in the ultimate outcome of the Court's decision over the ZEDE Amendment and Statute, they were not the only consideration. The Court still needed to address potential substantive challenges to the laws. Significantly, the Honduran Supreme Court, as a civil law institution, was not bound to its decision on the RED Amendment and
Statute and was therefore free to apply contradictory reasoning.
The primary argument against the ZEDE Amendment was that it attempted to amend provisions of the Constitution of which Article 374 forbids amendment. The unamendable provisions under question were the articles relating to the national territory and to the form of government. The most natural interpretation of these prohibitions is to limit their application to Title I, Chapters I (articles 1-8) and II (articles 9-14) of the Constitution, which are titled "Organization of the The scope of Article 374's prohibition against amendment of articles relating to the "national territory" is likely confined to articles 9-14, which constitute Chapter II of the Constitution.
Chapter II is titled "The Territory" and contains basic provisions regarding the area that the Honduran government has sovereignty and jurisdiction over. The ZEDE Amendment attempts to address some concerns over violation of these provisions by stating that ZEDEs are subject to articles 10, 11, 12, and 13. 169 However, to examine the ZEDEs' constitutionality, one must look beyond these assurances and investigated whether the ZEDE Amendment effectively violate these articles regardless.
Of the provisions relating to the national territory, articles 9-11 outline the territory of Honduras and article 12 states that the Honduran government exercises sovereignty over that territory, as well as its air space, subsoil, territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, and continental shelf. Thus, nothing in the ZEDE Amendment suggests that it necessarily violates the prohibition against amending articles relating to the national territory. When combined with the ZEDE Amendment's explicit affirmation that ZEDEs will be subject to Honduran sovereignty with regard to national territory, the Court had strong reason to believe ZEDEs will very much be part of Honduras.
(ii) Constitutional constraints on ZEDEs imposed by Article 107
While none of the provisions of the Constitution relating to the national territory affect the ZEDE 178 However, the article suggests its terms may be modified for "urban property, which shall be dealt with by a special law." 179 The "special law" came with Decree 90-90, which allows non-nationals to acquire "urban property" regardless of whether it lies in the areas prohibited by Article 107, but limits the definition of "urban property" to areas declared by the Office of Culture and Tourism to be "tourist areas." 180 Acquired property in these areas may be used only for approved "tourism projects" that promote economic development, social development, or the public interest as determined by the Office of Culture and Tourism 181 or as living quarters for the person acquiring the property so long as the quarters do not exceed 3,000 square meters. 182 Thus, for non-naturalborn Hondurans to acquire any interest in land within 40km of the shoreline, the Office of Culture and Tourism must declare the area encompassing the land to be a tourist area, and the land must be used either for approved tourism projects or as private housing for the person acquiring the property. 183 Absent these criteria, contracts for the acquisition of coastal land violate Article 107 and are voided. would be carefully regulated. Any foreign-owned property would need to be restricted either to 3,000 square meter plots for the owners' residences or to certified tourism activities.
Third, ZEDEs could be located in areas within 40km of the coast or adjacent to the national borders regardless of whether they are in designated "tourist-urban" areas but direct foreign ownership would be prohibited. Under this arrangement, Article 107 would be a qualification on the right conferred in the ZEDE Statute to own property regardless of nationality. 191 NonHondurans could not directly own property, but could perhaps still "reside in . . . use or otherwise possess" it. 192 The ZEDE would still meet its obligation to grant equal treatment, because the Statute explicitly excepts preferences granted to Hondurans by birth under the Constitution, of which Article 107 arguably is.
Under the third option, foreign owners could possibly establish Honduran companies to purchase property. 194 Foreigners could also potentially lease land owned by the ZEDE government or other Honduran entities. 195 For rural ZEDEs, the ZEDE statute envisions government ownership of all land anyway, 196 
(i) The ZEDEs and the sovereignty of the people of Honduras
Popular sovereignty was a major issue in the challenge to the RED laws. 197 Article 2 stipulates First, Article 2 explains that the people's sovereignty is to be "exercised through representation."
Article 5 further suggests that an additional key element to this exercise will be participatory democracy, which will be implemented through the referendum, the plebiscite, as well as democratic representation. Thus, to comply with the Constitution's provisions regarding popular sovereignty, the ZEDE Amendment and Statute should, at a minimum, provide popular control through democratic representation--because it appears to be the most emphasized mechanism for exercising sovereignty--and possibly referendum or plebiscite mechanisms.
The ZEDE Amendment, by itself, probably complies with these provisions. The ZEDE Amendment was passed through at least 2/3 of popularly elected representatives in Congress. 199 Furthermore, unlike the RED Amendment, the ZEDE Amendment requires the people living in a proposed ZEDE site to approve the creation of a ZEDE by plebiscite. However, the ZEDE Statute goes further in stripping sovereignty than the RED Statute because it does not provide for any popularly elected government officials over the ZEDEs. 202 All members of the Committee are appointed by the President and other officials appear to be appointed by Committee members. Unlike the RED Statute, there is no indication that the officials will eventually be chosen through popular elections. Thus, while the ZEDE Amendment likely complies with the Constitution, the ZEDE Statute may not.
(ii) The ZEDEs and the three-branch structure of Honduran government of government by unconstitutionally delegating power from the three branches of government to the ZEDEs. The RED Statute was characterized as stripping the functions of the national government and conferring them on domestic or foreign investors, which would establish separate systems of government each operating under their own rules with their own judiciary.
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The ZEDE Statute stops far short of altering the Honduran form of government, however. First, all three branches would continue governing in the same manner over areas not encompassed by the ZEDEs. 209 Second, even under the terms of the ZEDE Statute, the ZEDEs would still be subject to the national government authority over foreign affairs, immigration, ratification of treaties, national symbols, the territorial sea, and the contiguous zone. 210 The President would also have the power to appoint ZEDE officials. 211 Also, the Supreme Court of Honduras would presumably retain the power to decide Constitutional matters arising within the ZEDEs because Constitution would still be the highest authority within the ZEDEs, and the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over constitutional disputes. 212 Arguably, the fact that the ZEDE Courts are not subject to the Supreme Court in relation to nonconstitutional issues raises concern, but this concern is possibly dealt with through careful drafting of the ZEDE Amendment. The ZEDE Amendment appears to change the Constitution to allow ZEDE courts to be independent entities on all matters not concerning the Honduran constitution. The Spanish wording of the new Article 303 translates as "The Judiciary is pursuant to the Constitution, and other dependencies that the law specifies. 214 The italicized portion was added under the ZEDE Amendment. 215 The reintroduction of the words "por la" Other constitutional provisions regarding the individual rights of Hondurans will affect the ZEDEs, though they will not necessarily render them unconstitutional. Several arguments were made against the REDs alleging that they violated individual fundamental rights and these arguments will likely be made against the ZEDEs. While none of them are likely strong enough to invalidate the ZEDEs, there are important labor provisions of the Constitution that will limit the autonomy of the ZEDEs.
First, the RED laws were alleged to violate the principal of equal treatment under the law because they would have provided Hondurans living within REDs access to greater job opportunities, education, health care, and economic stability than Hondurans living elsewhere. 224 This argument seems weak both in relation to REDs and ZEDEs because the laws do not direct public resources in an unequal manner among Hondurans, but merely allow governments within
Honduras to attempt to provide better living conditions for the people within their jurisdictions.
Also, the REDs were characterized as essentially removing territory from the state of Honduras, which violated Constitutional protections against expatriation of Hondurans to foreign states and against compelling Hondurans to change their residence. 225 As described above, however, the ZEDEs fall far short of removing territory from the Honduran state. 226 However, while the ZEDE Statute does not appear to necessarily violate any provisions conferring individual rights, the rights are still applicable in the ZEDEs, and ZEDE administrations will need to acknowledge them. Most significantly, the Honduran Constitution imposes stringent minimum labor conditions for all Hondurans. For example, Article 128
mandates an eight-hour workday and forty-hour work week, 227 equal pay for equal work, 228 minimum age requirements, 229 annual paid vacations, 230 maternity leave, 231 and various other requirements. 232 The ZEDE Statute does not make reference to these provisions, which may mislead investors. Besides stating that employers will be subject to International Labor
Organization and other treaty standards, the ZEDE Statute only explicitly adopts Article 137, which requires employers in the ZEDE to make at least 90% of their workforce Hondurans and to pay them at least 85% of the company's total payroll. 233 The Honduran Supreme Court's decision not only justified Honduras' ZEDE project, but it served as an important test case for the legality of Paul Romer's broader charter cities concept.
If Romer's idea is implemented in other countries, it will likely face legal questions similar to those addressed in this paper and raised by the Honduran Supreme Court.
Still, the zones' effectiveness depends greatly on continued support from Congress and additional legal provisions. If the Honduran government truly wants to establish zones that will be shielded from corruption and changing politics, it could bolster the ZEDE laws in a few ways. It could provide for more democratic participation in ZEDE governance or implement other mechanisms for promoting transparency and making government responsive and accountable. Additionally, it could implement stronger mechanisms to avoid corruption and unfair subsidies to specific domestic or foreign investors at the expense of the Honduran population. It could also amend Article 107 to allow foreign ownership in the ZEDEs, which should increase beneficial foreign investment.
Furthermore, if the Honduran government truly seeks to make the ZEDEs autonomous and insulated from future outside political changes it needs to implement additional legal protections for the ZEDEs. Its first step would be to amend Article 206 of the Honduran Constitution, which prevents Congress from delegating its powers to other entities. The amendment could provide an exception for delegating powers to the ZEDE governments. The ZEDE Statute could also be amended to more explicitly prohibit application of Honduran laws in the ZEDEs, other than those laws to which the ZEDE Statute already permits, such as provisions of the Constitution.
Amendments may not be enough, however, because a strong congressional majority can amend, and re-amend, the Honduran Constitution relatively easily, as has been demonstrated repeatedly over the last several decades. To address this concern, the Honduran government could consider signing contracts with the ZEDE governments and with investors in the ZEDEs that guarantee autonomy for a defined period. The contracts could provide investors and the ZEDE authorities 
